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At the time of this writing there is a presidential campaign happening in the United States.​  1
The campaign has been unique in a number of ways, the novelty of its political discourse chief 
among them. What candidates in both major parties have said—whether advocating socialism in 
a country hostile to it, or referring to one another’s genitalia during televised debates—has 
disturbed many in the public sphere, both in the U.S. and around the world. President Barack 
Obama shared this unnerved reaction. He spoke on the subject at Syracuse University in New 
York on March 28, 2016, at the award ceremony for the Toner Prize for Excellence in Political 
Reporting. What he said relied on the idea of truth, and the extent to which political campaigns, 
journalists, and other citizens are concerned with it: “When our elected officials and political 
campaigns become entirely untethered to reason and facts and analysis, ​when it doesn’t matter 
what’s true and what’s not​ , that makes it all but it impossible for us to make good decisions for 
future generations.“   2
According to President Obama, in the course of a political campaign, a candidate or other 
citizen may become “untethered to reason and facts” such that “it doesn’t matter what’s true and 
what’s not.” The implication here is that contemporary presidential campaign discourse has 
become separated from reason and truth in just in this way. His usage of the term “true” is 
ambiguous, though we might guess at the theory of truth he intends. The word “untethered” 
implies that a discourse where “what’s true and what’s not” matters is connected, a part of, or 
otherwise linked to a domain of things that exist about which we might speak truthfully. In 
other words, that statements and claims and arguments—specifically in political 
campaigns—aim at corresponding to the world such that they are “factual” claims and 
1 Citation: ​Backer, D. I. (2016). “Toward an Activist Theory of Language.” In ​Truth in the Public Sphere​ , Hannan, J. 
Editor. Lexington Books.​Thank you to the students in the Readings in Communication and Social Thought seminar, 
Fall 2014, Teachers College, Columbia University. This chapter is a write up of that course. 
2 Obama, as quoted by The White House, “Remarks by the President,” para. 13 (emphasis added). 
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 statements. Interestingly, President Obama goes on to claim in that speech that candidates, when 
thus untethered, are merely jockeying for position in a game of power—saying whatever they 
can to get the requisite attention which will launch them into the nomination and then the 
presidency. But what if this jockeying for position—attempting to vindicate one’s own status or 
vision of the world—has a theory of truth itself? It could be that, in political contexts, one must 
“untether” oneself from the notion that true statements correspond to a reality in order to 
vindicate one’s position through discourse. It could be that there is a theory of truth in this 
untethering; a theory of language whose paradigm stipulates that “what’s true and what’s not” 
are precisely those statements which successfully vindicate one’s position or vision of the world 
under a specific set of political circumstances.  
On such a theory, one must untether from reason and facts and analysis in order to speak 
statements with which others can make decisions for future generations: vindicating one’s 
ideology seeks, presumably, to achieve an office from which one can guide the course of events. 
Speaking truly, on the theory of truth just proposed, gets one to such an office. This chapter 
introduces one approach to such a theory of language, what I call an “activist” theory of 
language. Thus the chapter serves as a kind of primer for that theory, sketching some important 
ideas that gesture towards a fuller one. To do this, I present the Althusserian Marxist 
philosopher of language Jacques Lecercle’s notion of “correctness,” drawing from his ​Marxist 
Philosophy of Language​ . A correct statement—like a slogan—names the present conjuncture (a 
Gramscian term) and condenses it in such a way as to vindicate an ideological position. In this 
way, the activist theory of language shares some qualities in common with speech act theory 
(though differs from correspondence and consistency theories of truth), which is not a theory of 
truth so much as an account of certain kinds of sentences that are actions themselves. ​ For the 3
activist theory of language, the paradigm of truth stipulates that true statements are correct 
statements: those which vindicate a particular ideology successfully. While it may be disturbing, 
what frontrunner Donald Trump has said and continues to say in this campaign cycle, for 
example, has certainly been effective in vindicating his political position. According to the 
activist paradigm, he has spoken correctly and therefore truly; whether the public sphere (or the 
president) likes it or not.  
 
 
Towards an Activist Theory of Language 
 
According to Lecercle, correctness, as a value of statements, is one way of understanding 
the implications of Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism in the philosophy of language. 
Truth-as-correctness says (following the French Marxist Louis Althusser) that “a correct 
philosophical thesis is one that enables adjustment to the conjuncture.” ​ Further elaboration of 4
the important term “conjuncture” will follow in the coming section. A statement is true if it is 
correct, according to Lecercle, which is to say that the statement permits understandings and 
actions which accord—are “adjusted to”—a set of contemporary political and social forces. A 
correct slogan for instance, following V.I. Lenin, identifies the moment of conjuncture and 
3 Lecercle, ​A Marxist Philosophy of Language​ , 40. I would like to thank Jason Hannan for many helpful 
comments on the original version of this chapter, including this one. 
4 Ibid. 
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 “​names the political task​  corresponding to the moment of conjuncture.” ​ Naming the political 5
task appropriate to a particular set of circumstances is to tell the truth on this theory. A correct 
statement is also one that “​condenses​  and ​embodies​  the concrete analysis of the concrete 
situation.” ​ Lecercle continues: “The implicit Leninist slogan here is ‘without correct slogans, 6
no successful revolution.’” ​ In other words, correct slogans are necessary for successful 7
revolution and, by extension, successful revolution is one way to determine whether a statement 
is correct or incorrect; and therefore true or untrue. 
“Conjuncture” is a crucial term here, since correctness requires that statements condense 
and embody the conjuncture. Antonio Gramsci writes the term “conjuncture” in the ​Prison 
Notebooks ​ as he interprets military history, going back to Caesar’s time in Rome to his own 
20th twentieth-century Italy. The term “conjuncture” has a military connotation, referring to “a 
combination of real circumstances” forming “a moment of the system of relations of force 
which exists in a given situation.” ​ The conjuncture can include things like “the qualitative 8
condition of the leading personnel.” ​ Generally speaking, “strategic preparation,” which keeps 9
the conjuncture in mind, “tends to reduce to zero the so-called ‘imponderable factors’—in other 
words, the immediate, unpremeditated reactions at a given moment of the traditionally inert 
passive forces.” ​ The conjuncture is therefore a set of “factors” regarding the who, what, when, 10
where, and how of existing political forces, particularly in response to possible threats to their 
current balances (what I will call the “status quo”). This set of factors can also include “the 
relations between international forces . . . to the objective relations within society—in other 
words, the degree of development of productive forces; to relations of political force and those 
between parties; and to immediate (or potentially military) political relations.”  11
Naming a conjuncture entails a kind of reality or fact. Conjunctural facts, following 
Gramsci, Lenin, and Althusser, are facts of struggle—in a Marxist context, class struggle. 
Again, the term emerges from discourses on “strategic preparation of the theatre of struggle”  12
and refers, in a Marxist usage, to “the balance of forces between the classes in struggle.”   13
“Struggle” for present purposes may be understood through the lens of contradictions and 
crises ​ in society which over time populate a conjuncture. A conjuncture is therefore more than 14
just a status quo. It is the conflicted aspects of a status quo, the cracks where the status quo 
begins to break down and to which the forces devoted to maintaining that status quo flock in 
attempts to seal the fissure. For instance: 
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that 
incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, 
despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existence of the 
structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome 
5 Ibid., italics mine. 
6 Ibid., 97, italics mine. 
7 Ibid. 
8 ​Gramsci, ​Selections from the Prison Notebooks​ , 217. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 197 
12 Ibid., 217. 
13 Lecercle, ​A Marxist Philosophy of Language​ , 101. 
14 See ​Harvey, ​Seventeen Contradictions​ . 
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 them. These incessant and persistent efforts . . . form the terrain of the “conjunctural,” and it is 
upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize.  15
Various struggles over the working day during the industrial era, beginning in an organized 
fashion in the late 19th century with the birth of the labor movement, are paradigm cases of 
Gramsci’s “terrain” of conjunctural struggle. Such struggles arise around an “incurable 
structural contradiction” where certain “political forces” seek to prevent, through defense and 
conservation, other political forces (“forces of opposition”) from changing and threatening a 
status quo. The length of the working day has been one site of struggle for generations, 
composing one central feature in the terrain of capitalist conjunctures. The struggle itself comes 
about from a contradiction in capitalism. In Karl Marx’s ​Capital Vol. 1​ , Marx points to an 
“antimony” between two groups in a capitalist economy. The first group are capitalists who 
own the means of production, including the productive force of labor power purchased from 
workers with wages. The second group are workers who act as sellers of their labor power. The 
capitalist buys labor power from the worker, who sells it for the price of the wage. However, 
“the peculiar nature of the commodity sold [labor] implies a limit to its consumption by the 
purchaser, and the laborer maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working 
day to one of definite normal duration.” ​ (p.243) According to the law of exchanges, the 16
purchaser has a right to the commodity purchased—the employer can stipulate how long the 
working day must be. Also according to the law of exchange, the seller has the equal right to 
sell that commodity at a certain duration—the worker can stipulate how and when the labor is 
expended, particularly by demanding (through striking, for example) that the working day be 
eight hours rather than ten or fourteen. “Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, 
the determination of what is a working day, presents itself as the result of a struggle.” ​ (Ibid.)  17
For the activist theory of language, this case becomes paradigmatic when one considers the 
truth or falsity of statements regarding the length of working days. In a hypothetical scenario 
between an employer and employee, the two have equal rights on the law exchanges to demand 
that the working day be of different lengths. The employer might say “the working day is ten 
hours long” and the employee might say “the working day is eight hours long.” Who is correct? 
How long must the working day be? The notion of correctness requires that there will be a 
struggle, however quick or prolonged, which determines the truth or falsity of these statements. 
If the employees capitulate or do not otherwise organize themselves into something like a union 
which then, through collective bargaining, demands a certain length to the working day, then 
the employer’s statement will be correct. If the employees do organize and successfully push for 
a contract which stipulates a certain length of the working day (and the employers agree to this 
contract), then the employees’ statement will be correct. It will be true, in other words, that the 
employees’ statement about the length constitutes the working day. The truth of the statement 
making reference to the working day is thereby decided by struggle in the conjuncture, and the 
side vindicated in the struggle is correct. By extension, the language with which the employees’ 
enunciate their case—in pamphlets, chants, songs, etc.—are also correct because, with this 
language, they vindicate their side of the struggle. The workers’ stipulation of the working day’s 
length as well as their campaign language is therefore true because it is correct, which is to say 
that they vindicated their side of the opposition in a conjunctural struggle. These conjunctural 
15 Gramsci, ​Selections from the Prison Notebooks​ , 178. 
16 Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p.243. 
17 Ibid. 
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 struggles are how correct statements get their meaning in general: “[It is] the moment of the 
conjuncture and the conjuncture that allows it to make sense. The conjunctural character of 
meaning is the content of the concept of correctness.”   18
Correctness is a value which describes the way in which these statements are true. Since 
correctness in this sense refers to the extent to which a statement names and condenses a 
conjuncture, it is not circular to claim that true statements, for the activist theory of language, 
are correct statements. Much like performativity theory (though importantly different, as I will 
show) a statement “in the last analysis . . . is ‘true’ if it becomes a new reality, if the forces of 
opposition triumph.” ​ Such statements come about “in a series of ideological, religious, 19
philosophical, political, and juridical polemics, whose concreteness can be estimated by the 
extent to which they are convincing, and shift the previously existing disposition of social 
forces.” ​ Vindication, in this context, is precisely achieving such a “triumph” where “shifts” 20
occurs in the existing disposition of social forces. Language which vindicates a side in a 
conjunctural struggle shifts the balance of existing forces in society, decisively creating a 
triumph for that side in the struggle. 
Yet the terms of the activist theory of language go beyond vindication. Certainly 
vindication is grounds for correctness. If a side in a conjunctural struggle achieves its aims 
while working within the contradiction at that part of the conjuncture, then statements 
describing their vindication will be correct and therefore true. There is a distinction here 
between two kinds of correct statements according to the activist theory of language. One kind 
of correct statement is true because a side in a conjunctural struggle has been clearly vindicated. 
The working day example is one such case. When a group of employees go on strike with a 
demand for a shorter working day, there is a clear moment (the signing and enactment of the 
contract) when the truth about the working day gets decided in struggle. The struggle for that 
demand ends. A simple activist theory of language would say that only those correct statements 
clearly decided in a struggle can be true and false. This simple version of the theory would have 
to proffer a third value, like the “undecided” value of an anti-realist theory of truth, and say that 
all statements in undecided struggles are neither true nor false. But there are many struggles 
whose demands are less clear and less likely; struggles which are ongoing, out of which 
language emerges which distinguish perspectives in conjunctural struggles.  
A modified activist theory of language, a more inclusive version of the theory, would say 
that there are some correct statements whose truth results from gains made in the process of 
vindication within a conjunctural struggle, though no single side has clearly won. Thus the 
importance of naming the conjuncture, calling for the appropriate action, and embodying the 
conjuncture. Correct statements according to this inclusive activist theory of knowledge are 
those that name the terrain of a conjuncture, embody struggle, and call for appropriate action. 
These criteria may be sufficient for a statement’s correctness, despite the fact that one side in 
the struggle has not been vindicated. The simple activist theory of language might claim that 
vindication is necessary and sufficient for correctness. In other words, a correct statement must 
emerge from a clearly vindicated side in a conjunctural struggle. Certainly (the simple version 
says) statements which embody, name, condense, or call for appropriate action within a 
conjunctural struggle are necessary for correctness; but they are not sufficient. The modified 
18 Lecercle, ​A Marxist Philosophy of Language​ , 98. 
19 Gramsci, ​Selections from the Prison Notebooks​ , 178. 
20 Ibid. 
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 inclusive version of the theory is less demanding. Rather than requiring “clear vindication” 
through a procedure like collective bargaining and contract arbitration (or elections or 
revolutions, perhaps), the modified inclusive activist theory of language could require one or a 
combination of naming, condensation, embodying, or calling for appropriate action in a 
conjunctural struggle when it comes to correctness. Each version has benefits and drawbacks. 
The benefit of the simple version is that there is a clear line between true and false statements. A 
drawback might be that there are many statements which are as-yet undetermined, since there is 
no procedure that can say a side has been vindicated. A further drawback of this version is the 
question of procedure: how do we know what is an appropriate way to determine a side has 
been vindicated? A benefit of the modified inclusive version of the theory is that it can be used 
flexibly to say that certain statements are true or false depending on the extent to which they 
name the conjuncture, embody the conjuncture, condense the conjuncture, or call for 
appropriate action within the conjuncture.  21
For example, there may be statements which achieve interpellative saturation in public 
discourse, a saturation which evinces the statement’s correctness even though there has not been 
a clear vindication of one side in a struggle. For Louis Althusser, interpellation is the “function 
of ideology,” ​ or the way in which ideology propagates. The French word ​interpellation​  means 22
“to hail” and, the process of ideological hailing, as Althusser intends it, “recruits” subjects from 
among individuals. Interpellation makes individuals subject to ideologies, in other words. 
Althusser writes that “ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way as to ‘recruit’ subjects among 
individuals . . . or ‘transforms’ individuals into subjects . . . through the very precise operation 
that we call interpellation or hailing.” ​ The now classic example of this transition from 23
individuality to becoming a subject of authority is the hailing of a citizen by a police officer. 
While walking down the street, a police officer says “Hey you!” to a citizen and that citizen 
turns around, facing the officer. Interpellation has partially occurred here, completing in the 
officer’s examination of the citizen’s national papers to ensure the person is French and not 
some outsider. The citizen in this case has become a subject of the state, hailed by the 
commanding gaze of one of its representatives. Althusser narrates the situation: “There are 
individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out, ‘Hey, you 
there!’ An individual . . . turns around, believing-suspecting-knowing that he’s the 
one—recognizing, in other words, that he ‘really is the person’ the interpellation is aimed at.”  24
The purpose of revisiting this idea in the history of Marxist philosophy is to emphasize the 
importance of language to interpellation. The ideology gives the interpellation “Hey, you 
there!” its meaning. Lecercle echoes the Althusserian aphorism that ideology is allusion more 
than illusion, for instance. In an activist theory of language, ideology furnishes statements with 
meaning. ​ Vindicated ideologies compose the meanings of words and statements over time. As 25
mentioned above, it is a matter of debate what criterion is best for deciding when a certain 
ideology has been vindicated in conjunctural struggle. The phrase “interpellative saturation” 
21 Building out the activist theory of language further would require specification for each of these processes: 
condensation, naming, embodying, calling for appropriate action, and adjustment. I gesture towards specifying what 
each of these might mean using examples below. 
22 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 190. 
23 Ibid., 190. 
24 Ibid., 191. 
25 Ibid. 
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 was offered, by which is meant a certain critical mass of individuals have been recruited to an 
ideology such that certain statements have spread so widely as to indicate a kind of vindication. 
For the simple version of the activist theory, an election might be a reasonable way to determine 
the correctness of certain statements. When Donald Trump surges in the Republican presidential 
nominating contest and supporters repeat his talking points and slogans, his success is a criteria 
by which we can determine whether what he says is true. The phrase “Build a wall!” has 
successfully interpellated many of Trump’s followers and interlocutors. Given his success in the 
media, the ways in which conversations about the election tend to focus on Trump, it may be 
the case that his discourse has achieved interpellative saturation. For many, what Trump says 
embodies the conjuncture—the contradictions and tensions of the present moment—and 
condenses this conjuncture, naming appropriate tasks to vindicate their side of certain struggles. 
The simple version of correctness would require that Trump win the general election and 
become president before saying whether these statements are correct. In this case, the election 
serves as the procedure by which we can determine if a side in a struggle has been vindicated. 
The modified inclusive version of the theory however might say that, independently of the 
outcome of the election, Trump’s name, his slogans, and his ideas have achieved an 
interpellative saturation which imbues statements from his campaign with truth. They are 
correct because they have spread, propagating his ideological stance at the site of a number of 
structural contradictions (which the Republican Party establishment—against Trump—is 
currently working to cure, as Gramsci would say). 
To further clarify, I have not specified the exact differences between statements that 
condense, embody, adjust, or call for action with respect to their conjunctures. These terms 
describe criteria for correctness of a statement in the activist theory of language. If a statement 
condenses a conjunctural struggle, it is a possible candidate for correctness. If a statement helps 
speakers adjust to the conjunctural struggle; if a statement embodies that struggle; if a statement 
calls for an appropriate action within that struggle—each of these describe the qualities of 
potentially correct statements (for the modified inclusive version, of course). Lecercle, in ​A 
Marxist Philosophy of Language,​  articulates these qualities, but does not build them out. 
Looking at some of Donald Trump’s slogans, the differences take shape. “Build a wall!” clearly 
demands an action at the conjuncture of immigration policy. In one vignette, white students 
chanted this slogan at a basketball game where their mostly white team played against a team 
with minority students.  ​Call to action​  demands that certain things happen in the conjunctural 26
struggle. “Make America great again” condenses the conjuncture (implying the other slogan 
that “we don’t win anymore” ​): the United States has lost its power, prestige, or value, and the 27
Trump campaign will restore these to the nation. ​Condensation​  succinctly expresses a 
conjunctural struggle. “We don’t win anymore” (one of Trump’s critical tropes) or “they’re 
chopping off heads” ​ (in reference to the Islamic State) make the conjunctural struggle felt in a 28
visceral way, embodying the situation. ​Embodying ​ makes the conjuncture felt.  
Consider other phrases, like “We are the 99%!” This exclamation was a flagship slogan 
during Occupy Wall Street, a global movement responding to oppression, mostly in the form of 
income inequality and distributive injustice. ​ From Al Gore’s utterance of “the wealthiest one 29
26 “High School Basketball Fans Chant,” ​Talking Points Memo News​ .  
27 “Trump: We Don’t Win Anymore,” ​Reuters. 
28 Berenson, “Donald Trump Defends Torture at Republican Debate,” ​Time​ .  
29 Weinstein, “We Are The 99% Creators Revealed,” ​Mother Jones​ .  
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 percent” in the 2000 United States presidential campaign ​ to Joseph Stieglitz’s title “Of the 1%, 30
by the 1%, for the 1%” in a ​Vanity Fair ​ article in May 2011, ​ to David Graeber’s utterance of 31
the same when describing the motivations for a New York City General Assembly, ​ to the 32
widespread utterance of the slogan during demonstrations in the cities internationally. The 
statement “We are the 99%!” enabled adaptation to the conjuncture: it helped citizens adjust to 
the reality of the conjunctural struggle between the wealthy and the working class. ​Adjustment 
clarifies the terms of a struggle. Certainly the phrase implies a call to action as well, gesturing 
towards a task appropriate for that conjuncture: collective action against the financial 
institutions which perpetrated the crisis.  
Similar analyses are possible for “Oxi!” from the Greek debt crisis, and phrases from the 
Black Lives Matter movement such as “I can’t breathe!” The Greek people, in an unexpected 
referendum held by the Leftist party Syriza, voted by majority against another cycle of loans 
with austerity conditions from the Troika. ​ The word “Oxi” (Greek for “No”) comes to name a 33
site of struggle between the status quo of debt financing, German economic hegemony, and 
single-currency policies of the European Union. “Oxi” is a call to appropriate action primarily, 
demanding a “no” vote to a referendum which asked the Greek people whether the nation 
should forge another austerity plan with the Troika. Incidentally, while the Greek people voted 
“Oxi” on that proposal the Syriza government went on to make an austerity plan under 
pressures from both within and outside their coalition. In that case, no meant yes, so to speak, 
and “Oxi” was incorrect.  
In the second phrase, Eric Garner, a middle-aged Black man from Staten Island, New York, 
was seized by five white police officers, one of whom used a chokehold maneuver on Garner, 
which eventually killed him. The arrest (murder) was recorded on camera. Garner was 
supposedly selling a cigarillo and yelled “I can’t breathe!” while the officer choked him. ​ The 34
phrase, as it was adopted by activists, names the suffocating institutional racism in United 
States, manifesting now as police brutality. Millions chanted “I can’t breathe!” ​ This phrase 35
embodies the conjunctural struggle between the Black community and White policing (and the 
criminal justice system in general). Suffocation is a physical happening, something that occurs 
to the body, but which also represents the inability for members Black community to survive 
and thrive in United States society. According to the modified inclusive activist theory of 
language, these statements are true to the extent that they are correct: the extent to which they 
enable adjustment to the conjuncture, identify the conjunctural moment, name the task best 
suited for that moment, and condense and embody that moment.  
There is another distinction to be made here between a strong version of the modified 
activist theory and a weaker version. The strong version would stipulate some combination of 
the criteria elaborated above: condensation, call for action, adjustment, and naming the moment. 
The strongest activist theory of language a correct statement to condense and call for action and 
30 Gore, as quoted by ABC News, “Prepared Remarks of Al Gore’s Acceptance Speech.” Gore said that 
“​under the tax plan the other side has proposed, for every ten dollars that goes to the wealthiest one percent, middle 
class families would get one dime. And lower-income families would get one penny.”  
31 Stieglitz, “Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%.” 
32 Graeber, “On Playing By The Rules.” 
33 Cassidy, “Oxi: A Historic Greek Vote Against Austerity,” ​The New Yorker​ . 
34 “Protests Erupt in Wake of Chokehold Death,” ​CNN​ .  
35 Ibid. 
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 adjust and name the moment, such that if the statement does not meet any one of those criteria 
is will not be correct. Weaker versions of the theory replace the “ands” here with “ors” in the 
criteria for correctness, the weakest being that a statement is correct if it condenses or calls for 
action or adjusts or names the moment. The simple activist theory of language will ask for 
evidence of vindication, rendering this question of strength or weakness moot regarding the 
criteria for correctness in the modified inclusive theory.  
A basic articulation of the activist theory of language would be that it’s paradigm of truth is 
“truth-as-correctness.” Two varieties of correctness have been elaborated. The first version of 
correctness requires a clear procedure to determine whether a side in a conjunctural struggle. 
The correct statement, according to the activist theory, is a conjunctural reference: the extent to 
which it is “convincing” and shifts the previously existing disposition of social forces; names 
the moment in a theater of struggle; names, adjusts, condenses, and/or embodies the 
conjunctural struggle; or becomes a new reality. The activist theory of language, according to 
Lecercle, thus understands correctness as successful interpellation, but widely successful 
interpellation. If a statement is correct, then a certain ideology has been vindicated by its 
proponents such that those activists have achieved an interpellative saturation in public sphere 
discourse. The cases mentioned previously from Occupy Wall Street, Greece, and Black Lives 
Matter might be examples here. These statements achieved a certain saturation in the public 
sphere.  
Considerations 
One might be tempted to claim that the activist theory of language presented here is a 
relativist position with respect to truth. Take Althusser’s idea of interpellation. If an individual 
is hailed and recruited by a particular ideology, does that mean, according to the correctness 
paradigm, that the statements riding the interpellation are true? If so, the activist theory claims 
that true statements are true insofar as someone believes them to be true. But this is not what the 
activist theory is saying. The correctness paradigm requires that a statement names and 
condenses a conjuncture and creates a certain “saturation” of interpellations throughout 
discourse. The landscape of discourse must shift, so to speak, and the statements which 
compose that shift are correct and therefore true. Those fighting in the struggle learn to speak a 
certain way about the contours of the conjuncture, learning to understand the politics of their 
situation in a particular way. This discourse may be offensive, meaningless, or absurd to those 
who are impartial or on the other side of the struggle.  
The labels “pro-life” and “pro-choice” from the abortion debate in the United States are 
examples. Anti-abortion activists speak as if they are on the side of life, casting the pro-abortion 
side of this struggle as being against life, since the former consider abortion murder. 
Pro-abortion activists speak as if they are on the side of choice and freedom, casting the 
anti-abortion side as being against choice, since they advocate women’s ability to decide 
whether or not she should have an abortion (rather than the government). Activists have learned 
how to craft these terms, cast the struggle in a certain way to vindicate their positions at the 
struggle. The activist theory of language accounts for the truth of statements containing these 
adjectives (“Being pro-abortion is pro-choice”) if they name the conjuncture and spur shifts in 
the struggle in which they are uttered. Both of these adjectives (pro-choice and pro-life), having 
crystallized as the labels for the sides in the struggle, are to some degree correct. Again, the way 
to determine that degree is a matter for consideration. Supporters, successful legislation, or 
other measurements could in fact measure interpellative saturation. So can usage: if the Oxford 
9 
 English Dictionary adopts a new term, if a meme circulates on Facebook, if “everyone is talking 
about it,” all these scenarios indicate interpellative saturation. 
Another point: an activist theory of language is inherently educational. In struggle, words 
change meaning as activists teach speakers to speak differently. A recent example is the recent 
shift from uttering “illegal immigrant” when referring to persons living in a country without 
legal permission to do so, specifically in mainstream journalistic media. Though some refuse to 
utter the new term, keeping to “illegal immigrant,” the widely-accepted term of art is now 
“undocumented immigrant.” Kathleen Carroll, Senior Vice President and Executive Editor of 
the Associated Press, explained that 
  
The Stylebook no longer sanctions the term​「​illegal immigrant​」​or the use of 
「​illegal​」​to describe a person. Instead, it tells users that ​「​illegal​」​should describe only an 
action, such as living in or immigrating to a country illegally. 
Why did we make the change? 
The discussions on this topic have been wide-ranging and include many people from many 
walks of life. . . . Those discussions continued even after AP affirmed 
「​illegal immigrant​」​as the best use. 
A number of people felt that​「​illegal immigrant​」​was the best choice at the time. They 
also believed the always-evolving English language might soon yield a different choice and we 
should stay in the conversation.​  36
Carroll mentions how “many people from many walks in life” participated in the 
“discussions” and “conversation” around whether to use “illegal” or “undocumented” when 
referring to persons living in a country without permission. These people in their walks of life 
may be understood as occupying opposing positions at a struggle in the conjuncture. This 
particular struggle is over treatment of immigrants in the United States. One side of the struggle 
learned to think and speak a certain way about this struggle in order to vindicate their position 
within it: a welcoming treatment of immigrants, institutionalizing a frictionless and easy path to 
citizenship. The other side of the struggle also learned to think and speak in ways that 
vindicated their position: the harsh treatment of these immigrants, making it difficult, if not 
impossible, for them to become citizens. The former term, illegal immigrant, implies that a 
person is a thing that can be illegal, which the conservative side of the struggle (such as 
Republican Governor of Arizona Jan Brewer) maintains as both sensible and sensical. ​ It is 37
easier to treat an immigrant harshly if the person somehow, in their entirety, is against the law 
and therefore obviously wrong to make a citizen. On the other hand, if a person is thought of as 
being “undocumented,” then the implication that the person could become documented is built 
into the utterance, instituting within the term itself the possibility of citizenship. It is easy to see 
the struggle at this conjuncture in the AP’s back-and-forth decisions regarding the correct 
terminology. At first the AP decided to continue using “illegal immigrant,” but as the discussion 
continued, the organization decided to make the change.  
The way Carroll describes the “always-evolving English language” and how the language 
36 Carroll, as quoted in Colford, “‘Illegal Immigrant’ No More,’” para. 2–6. 
37 ​Planas, “Jan Brewer Will Keep Using the Term ‘Illegal Immigrant,’​” quotes Brewer as saying, “​Well I’m 
sorry but I believe that if you break the law and you’re an illegal immigrant and you’re in this country illegally, that 
you are an illegal immigrant. . . . We know they’re human beings, we know that they’re our brothers and our sisters, 
but we believe in the rule of law and we can’t afford it and we certainly can’t afford the criminal element” (para. 6).  
10 
 “might soon yield a different choice” bespeaks the struggle-oriented quality of usage. It is 
interesting that she attributes the new option’s emergence to the English language and not the 
activists who worked tirelessly to learn, craft, and disseminate this usage. It is as though the 
language speaks rather than speakers speaking the language. In any case, the AP made an 
informed decision to change its usage, learning to speak differently about persons living in a 
country without permission to do. The “accurate” usage is now to call such persons 
“undocumented.” In a debate between the two sides of this struggle, a conservative might say 
“illegal immigrant” and we might expect the progressive side to respond by saying something 
such as, “No, these people are not illegal immigrants but rather undocumented immigrants.” 
The latter contests the truth of the former’s utterance, claiming that a proposition containing the 
term “illegal immigrant” is false. Rather the truth of this claim rests on a claim to “correctness” 
or “accuracy” in accordance with the idea of a struggle within a conjunction. Engaging in this 
struggle on one of its sides requires an educational activity in learning new ways to speak that 
vindicate the speaker’s side. 
While activists learn to speak in certain ways, correctness requiring a kind of educational 
activity on the front end of activist utterance, there is another educational aspect of this theory: 
the consequences. In the above example, speakers learn to utter new phrases and terms—learn 
to speak correctly—when one of the sides in struggle is able, through language and action, to 
vindicate their side of the struggle. Impartial readers, persons, and organizations learn to speak 
differently when one of the sides is vindicated: and vindication, in this case, is almost identical 
to that educational activity. The extent to which a side speaks correctly is directly related to the 
number of people who learn to speak in their terms. Another way of putting this educational 
insight is to say that activists are teachers, and speakers not explicitly involved in the struggle 
but who learn to speak differently from activist speech speakers are students. When the 
victorious side of the struggle emerges, speaking its new learned discourse, new and unfamiliar 
terms, phrasings, utterances, and enunciations proliferate throughout the conjuncture and the 
wider society. It is a discursive way of thinking about historical, political, and social change. 
The movement of “We are the 99%!” from occupation to occupation, newspaper to newspaper, 
and mouth to mouth, shows how individuals ​learn​  to speak those words in a certain way. That 
change involves the changing of minds and hearts as struggles move forward, and occurs 
through discourse. Che Guevara, in describing the Cuban Revolution to Uruguayan readers in 
1976, described Cuban society at that time as a gigantic school.   38
A contemporary example of this notion of the gigantic school of revolution in language 
comes from Jill Soloway, the creator of the television show “Transparent.” In a recent profile in 
the New Yorker, Ariel Levy writes of an interaction with Soloway about gender-neutral 
pronouns.  
“A really interesting thought exercise is to say ‘they’ and ‘them’ for all genders,” Soloway 
instructed me [Levy]. . . . I pointed out that strict grammar forbids using the plural pronoun for a 
single person. . . . Soloway shook her head vigorously. “All of the magazines and newspapers 
need to begin to do this,” she said. “The language is evolving daily—even gender reassignment, 
people are now calling it gender confirmation!” She was getting excited. “The promise of this 
revolution is not having to say ‘Men do this, women do this.’. . . In a few years, we’re going to 
38 Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” para. 20. 
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 look back and say, “When we were little, we used to think that all women had vaginas and all 
men had penises, but now, of course, we know that’s not true.”  39
Here is a complete example illustrating the activist theory of language, and its educational 
quality, at the conjuncture of gender and transgender struggles. Soloway, a feminist, “instructs” 
Levy in avoiding usage of traditional gender categories “man” and “woman.” Soloway teaches 
Levy not to obey the “strict grammar” which “forbids” a certain way of speaking. That “strict” 
grammar, interpreted through the activist theory of language, ideologically preserves the gender 
binary used by one side of the struggle over gender. It is “false” to refer to a singular person 
with a plural pronoun, in this case, to the extent that it vindicates those seeking to preserve the 
traditional gender pronouns and ultimately the gender categories to which they refer. Soloway is 
aware of the politics of this grammar, noting that “the promise of this revolution,” the 
successful upending of traditional gender binaries, is “not having to say” that the binaries exist. 
She understands that truth and falsity are values decided by the correctness of statements, and 
that correctness is determined by the vindication of one’s side in a conjunctural struggle (rather 
than grammar rules). A consummate activist, she says that magazines “need” to learn to use the 
gender-neutral “they.” This “need” comes from Soloway’s activism, a desire to upend the 
gender binaries, the way in which the word ‘they’ embodies, names, and alters the conjuncture 
to vindicate the feminist position. Soloway becomes excited at the prospect of such changes in 
the language, noting that the “evolution” of the language (happening “daily”) maps to the social 
change for which she fights. She mentions another example of this evolution in the language 
containing the promise of revolution: the difference between “gender reassignment” and 
“gender confirmation.” The former vindicates the traditional patriarchal position, which works 
from the presumption that one’s given gender, one’s assigned gender, is the more authentic. For 
the patriarchy, a transition marks a “reassignment.” The latter term, however, “gender 
confirmation,” privileges not the assigned gender but rather the transitioned gender as being the 
more authentic, vindicating the transgender community’s position against the patriarchy. The 
transgender community would dispute the truth of the statement “a transition will sometimes 
require gender reassignment,” arguing that it is ​incorrect​  to refer to that procedure as a 
“reassignment.” Rather, it is correct to call it a “confirmation” of the person’s gender. (The 
same analysis holds for the prefix ​cis​  when referring to people who continue to identify with 
their patriarchally assigned genders. Transgender activists would say that it is incorrect to call 
myself a “man,” for instance, since this is the gender I was assigned at birth. Rather, it is more 
accurate to say that I am a “cisman.”)  
Soloway’s final line in this interaction marks another educational insight. Immediately after 
thinking through the political changes in language, she speculates that in the near future society 
will reflect that it has learned important lessons about gender binaries. The reflective 
formulation “we used to think that women had vaginas and men has penises, but now, of course, 
we know that’s not true” points to an educational shift in the assignation of truth to statements 
containing gender binaries. This “truth” is not the truth of correspondence, coherence, poetry, or 
performance. Rather it is the truth of accuracy—correctness—according to a vindicated group 
who struggled successfully against an existing balance of powers, victorious in their 
conjuncture, teaching society the truth in the process.  
39 Levy, “Dolls and Feelings.” 
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Precedents  
 
There are many precedents for the activist theory of language, and ways to clarify its 
paradigm of truth through contrasts with other paradigms. Lecercle’s thinking is heavily 
influenced by Michel ​Pêcheux​, another student of Louis Althusser. ​ Foucauldian and Butlerian 40
notions cast subjectivity as being composed of discourse, such that the body is “inscribed” with 
meanings. ​ Slavoj Zizek’s theory of ideology, drawing from psychoanalysis, claims that 41
ideology is a linguistic quality which gives a sense of reality to fantasies about society.  42
Valentin Volosinov, writing in Russia just after the revolution of 1917, anticipated this 
linguistic turn in theories of ideology; Lecercle also draws heavily from him. For Volosinov 
there is a difference between the physiological qualities of a thing and its “image.” ​ The 43
physiological qualities of a thing become apparent when it is considered as identical with itself: 
a hammer has a wooden handle with a metal head shaped thus and so, for example. The image 
of the hammer appears, on the other hand, when it is considered identical with other things: the 
USSR, for example. The symbolic meaning of a thing is always ideological, as opposed to its 
physiological aspects. Claiming that anything linguistic has ideological quality means that 
imagined aspect of utterance is necessary to it. Whenever we speak about something we refer, to 
some degree, to its image. The distinction is meant to be intuitive rather than complex and 
laborious to make. While the physiological hammer has certain physiological qualities it will 
appear to different people with different imagined qualities, and these differences map to 
ideological difference. That “hammer” can mean both the physical and imagined qualities of the 
object (that it might equally be spoken of as a thing with a wood handle and metal head used for 
building and symbolizing the USSR, or the god Thor, or John Henry for that matter) expresses 
the notion that language is ideological. These images accrue within a particular social context, 
where production and political life are arranged in particular ways. It is obvious that discourse 
happens within authoritarian societies, capitalist societies, communist societies, and any other 
manner of social-political arrangement, and that those arrangements will influence and be 
influenced by the discourse spoken within them. The social milieu composes the imagined 
aspects of meaning and vice versa.  
Signs . . . are particular material things; . . . any item of nature, technology, or consumption 
can become a sign, acquiring in the process a meaning that goes beyond its given particularity. 
A sign does not simply exist as part of reality—it reflects and refracts another reality. . . . Every 
sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation. . . . The domain of ideology coincides 
with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is 
present, too. ​Everything ideological possesses semiotic value​ .   44
Signs are material “segments of reality” in addition to being “shadows” of reality. They are 
things in the world like tables or iPads or pens. A sign however, unlike mere “items of nature, 
technology, or consumption,” presents something else: a sign presents something other than 
40 ​Pêcheux, ​Language, Semantics, and Ideology​ . 
41 ​Butler, ​The Psychic Life of Power​ . 
42 ​Žižek, ​The Sublime Object of Ideology​ . 
43 ​Volosinov, ​Marxism and the Philosophy of Language​ , 2. 
44 Ibid., 10, Volosinov’s italics. 
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 itself, “another reality,” the presentation of which can occur in a reflective and/or refractive 
mode. I say presentative and not representative intentionally, as one possible reading of the 
above passage is that signs may “distort” reality or be “true to” reality. Yet Volosinov also 
writes that a sign reflects and refracts “another reality,” giving the impression that there are only 
“other” realities presented by signs, rejecting the notion that there is one single reality which 
signs may successfully or unsuccessfully represent. 
The hashtag is one contemporary example of this difference between the physiological and 
the imaginative aspects of meaning. There is a difference between the proper name “Bernie 
Sanders” and the hashtag #BernieSanders. The former refers to the presidential candidate who is 
a democratic socialist, has white hair, is a senator from Vermont, etc. The hashtag, however, 
originates within a particular discursive community, which utters it in order to label, name, or 
participate in collective examination of a set of beliefs, questions, or themes: socialism, 
democracy, racial justice, banking reform, etc. The hashtag “links up” with the social context of 
the word or phrase’s utterance. The difference between the physiological and imaginative 
aspects of meaning is like the difference between a word or phrase and its hashtag equivalent. In 
other words, terms are hashtaggable because they are ideological, not because they refer to 
certain physiological qualities. It is the ideological quality of language which permits any word 
or phrase to become a hashtag. The contemporary correlate to Volosinov’s distinction between a 
thing’s name-as-identical-with-itself and name-as-image is the retweeted, hyperlinked, and 
“liked” signification of a word, phrase, or statement. The fact that any word, term, or phrase can 
potentially become a hashtag is one way of expressing the inherently ideological quality of 
language. Language is not entirely ideological, but there is an ideological aspect of language. 
The activist theory of language takes language to be ideological in this way, and the decision 
procedure within that theory which assigns values to statements draws from that ideological 
quality of language.  
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s ​The​  ​Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge​  contains a 
theory of language which could be a relative of the activist theory presented here. Lyotard 
politicizes the late Wittgenstein as a response to Habermas’s ​Legitimation Crisis​  and the latter’s 
concept of the ideal speech act. ​ Whereas Habermas assumes that scientific discourse (inquiry, 45
generally speaking) involves an exchange of denotative statements that aim at truth, Lyotard 
responds that this exchange can only occur because certain connotative statements are presumed 
beforehand. In other words, there are always rules of a language-game within (and due to) 
which any inquiry takes place. Since, in Lyotard’s view, the socio-political context (e.g., the 
consensus of postindustrialism) determines these rules, inquiry corrodes within itself since truth 
now must rely, to some degree, on the (victorious) rules of the postindustrial language game. 
Lyotard claims there is a “general agonistics” ​ in discussion: a struggle over what rules will be 46
put in place; a battle between those who accept a consensus and those who do not accept, or are 
not initiated into, that consensus.  47
45 See Lecercle, ​A Marxist Philosophy of Language​ , 45, for the Marxist response to Habermas’s philosophy of 
language. Lecercle claims this response turns Habermas on his head, following the way Marx’s philosophy of 
history is said to be an inversion of Hegel’s.  
46 Lyotard, ​The​  ​Postmodern Condition​ , 10. 
47 Ranciere’s work on disagreement and dissensus might be seen as an extension or development of this argument as 
it applies to democratic political theory and aesthetics. That is, what it means to disrupt the sensibility of an 
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 Lyotard’s precedent raises an important point. The activist theory of knowledge has much 
in common with the theory of performativity popularized by J. L. Austin in ​How to Do Things 
with Words.​  Austin distinguishes the performativity of certain statements in two ways: “A. they 
do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or false’; and B. the 
uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not 
normally​  be described as, or as ‘just’, saying something.” ​ Statements involved in accepting 48
marriage vows, naming a ship, bequeathing, and gambling are examples where “issuing of the 
utterance is the performing of an action.” ​ While performativity describes the ways in which 49
words do things, it is not a paradigm of truth. The activist theory of language might be thought 
of as a variety of performative statements which, if they do certain things (vindication or 
saturation), can be thought of as true or false.  50
Conclusion 
 
The activist theory of language and its paradigm of truth-as-correctness, while similar to 
the ways in which certain performative statements function, is importantly different than two 
(arguably obsolete) paradigms of truth: correspondence and coherence. A statement might be 
true because it refers to something. This something might be observable phenomena, for 
example. In this case a statement is true because it ​corresponds to something​ . On the other 
hand, a statement might be true because it is consistent with a set of axioms or linguistic habits, 
like a language-game. The state is therefore true because it ​coheres​  with other statements. 
Contrast these paradigms with the activist theory articulated here. Clear vindication or 
interpellative saturation may be observable and testable with quantitative or qualitative 
economic data, but ultimately these processes do not converge on a correspondence to empirical 
phenomenon, natural laws, or real objects. The truth of statements will depend on the extent to 
which it names the conjuncture and alters it. Certainly there may be an interpretation of “real” 
where that which is real is that which is ​correctly​  referred to. The activist statement is true 
because it does something, like the performative procedure, but may also be said to be true 
based on what it does. ​ This activist truth will, in contrast to the consistency theory, be true 51
precisely because it is inconsistent with the existing set of statements on the other side of a 
struggle in the conjuncture. 
As Valentin Volosinov wrote in the final sentence of ​Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language​ , we might say that the activist theory of language calls for “a revival of . . . the word 
that really means and takes responsibility for what it says.” ​ The activist theory of language 52
described here is a theory of this precise kind of ​responsibility​ : when we speak there is an 
ideological quality to our language which, over time, has resulted from struggles within the 
conjunctures of society. Meanings have been decided by vindication over time. Our speech 
patterns, styles, forms, and other discourses tell a history of struggle. Speaking responsibly in 
exclusive consensus (​ochlos​ ) such that the ​demos​  appears. See ​On the Shores of Politics​ , ​Disagreement​ , and ​The 
Politics of Aesthetics​ .  
48 Austin, ​How to Do Things with Words​ , 5. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, ​5–7.  
51 Lecercle, 2006, 129. 
52 Volosinov, ​Marxism and the Philosophy of Language​ , 158. 
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 this sense means speaking with an awareness of the accuracy and correctness of our statements, 
that their truth is to some degree decided by conjunctural struggle. Truth is not only decided 
through correspondence with real objects, consistency with stipulated axioms, poetic 
expression, or performative utterance. Truth is also decided, in the public sphere, through an 
activist procedure of struggle.  
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